“Follow the science”
The popularity of this refrain, though not lacking before the Coronavirus pandemic, reached such a pitch in 2020 and 2021 that it warrants a thorough repudiation. To begin with, “the science” is an ambiguous term and hence totally unsuitable to guide policy or positive action. What “science”? The term is often employed as a shorthand for “scientific consensus” with the implication that the latter is identical with truth. But the equation is problematic, as will be evident to anyone willing to reflect, even in the most cursory manner, on the history of science.1 Daniel Boorstin observed in 1983, for instance, that “The great obstacle to discovering the shape of the Earth, the continents and the oceans was not ignorance but the illusion of knowledge.”2 It can be seen that an appeal to consensus to settle a question is determinately unscientific, and actually stifles the engine of scientific progress. No one in the history of science ever contributed to advancing the discipline in any substantial way except by departure from “settled science.” It is incoherent to think scientific questions could be adjudicated by majority rule. Instead, questions must be settled through experiment and cogent argumentation, but those things are exactly what those who enjoin people to “follow the science” seem intent on avoiding. Hence, the statement is evidently intended to garner political clout rather than for communicating a reasonable proposition. Of course, when “the science” becomes “The Science™” and is wielded as a rhetorical device, it cannot but do significant harm to the reputation of bona fide science and bona fide scientists, and hence, when someone accuses another who refuses to toe the line in respect to whatever policy is being advanced in its name of being “anti-science,” the boot is really on the other leg. Indeed, it is likely that the most severe threat to the future legitimacy of conventional science—if it has not already arrived in the form of corporate and political capture of scientific institutions—has now arrived in the form of influential figures for whom the name of Science is ever at their lips.
But there is a more fundamental problem with the slogan in question than its vacuity and illusory referent, which the proposition that “water = dihydrogen oxide” may serve to illustrate. We need only consider that an exhaustive physical analysis of water would nevertheless remain totally silent about what water is. “What?” the objection will run, “isn’t that precisely what the scientific statement was meant to establish?” The objection is plausible only by resting on an equivocation between what something is and what that thing is made of. This is another way of expressing what Aristotle meant to distinguish with his formal and material causes, respectively.3 Someone who thinks they are the same thing should insist on being identified by his elementary chemical constituents.
Perhaps more to the specific point in question: the scientific definition of water must also remain silent about its value. That water is made of hydrogen and oxygen says nothing about whether water is good. “Wait,” the objection will run, “whether something is ‘good’ is not a scientific question.” Indeed, that is precisely the argument of this investigation. To wit, that “goodness” is not a scientific topic demonstrates, ipso facto, that the injunction to follow the science makes no sense.
Were someone to assert, in an attempt to turn the tables, that the goodness of a thing is indeed a scientific question, then he is either not talking about science as the word is usually understood, or he is tactically equivocating on the term, in what has sometimes been called the “motte-and-bailey fallacy.” Just as the inhabitants of a castle may retreat to the motte when the bailey is challenged, so it is possible for sophists to advocate for policies and positive action in the name of science (when convenient) while simultaneously asserting that science is about objective, quantifiable facts and not values (when necessary). Sam Harris, for instance, in his persona as a public intellectual, has adopted the motte-and-bailey strategy in his arguments for scientific morality. “Science,” Harris affirms, “is about facts, not norms; it might tell us how we are, but it couldn’t tell us what is wrong with how we are. There couldn’t be a science of the human condition”.4 And yet, the subtitle of the same book from which this statement is excerpted reads “How Science Can Determine Human Values.” In other words, according to Harris, (a) science is not about values but about cold, hard facts and (b) it can tell us how we ought to to live. In other words, “mote” and “bailey,” respectively. For Harris, that “pleasure,” “well-being,” or “the absence of suffering” are good is so obvious that it is unnecessary to argue the point. But this approach collapses the distinction between statements made in the indicative mood and statements made in the imperative mood. What merely seems good and what truly is good are intensionally distinct and often extensionally so as well. Indeed, the same distinction was the scruple around which the pearl of Philosophy first constellated itself in Plato’s day and it is, moreover, a distinction that will be evident to any soul who is willing to reflect on her own experience. Indeed, wisdom (Sophia) is the power that allows us to discern the difference between apparent goods and actual ones, and it is won through the exercise of reason upon experience. When science is substituted for philosophy, people do not cease to live by values, but only to ensure that those values are likely to remain unconscious and unexamined.5
Axiomatically, it is incoherent to say “follow the science because it’s bad to follow the science.” For something to be bad is not a reason to do it. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case. It is also incoherent to say “follow the science because it is neither good nor bad but totally impartial and neutral to follow the science.” If this were true, it would provide no grounds to prefer to follow the science over preferring not to follow it, or to do any other thing. The only valid injunction would be “follow the science because it’s good to do that,” or “because it’s better than any alternative, at least.” But there’s the rub: it’s sophistic to evade moral arguments under the pretext that science is about objective, quantifiable facts alone and then, in the same breath, enjoin people to “follow the science” as a slogan to motivate positive action. Either it’s the first, in which case science must remain silent over what is good and what people ought to do, or it is the second, in which case these normative claims must be defended on their own terms and not sidestepped by equivocating on the position one actually holds.
But, returning to the case statement presented in the first paragraph, another person might object, without appeal to science, that water is not truly good, and thereby attempt to disassemble the argument from its other end. Of course, this objection holds more weight because it does not saw of its own branch through sophistic argumentation but rather issues from a plain and naïve assessment of human experience. That being said, it’s more of a statement of opinion than an argument. Still, it is possible to address it on the terms in which it is being made. To begin with, it may be advised that anyone who wonders about whether water is good take a journey in the Grand Canyon without water. The elegance of this experiment lies in the fact that it makes not the slightest difference whether water is made from hydrogen and oxygen, or whether the Grand Canyon was the result of erosion by an ancient river or a cleft from Jove’s thunderbolt. In other words, the proof can be a self-evident object of direct experience. A person might concede that water is good when one is thirsty and nevertheless maintain that sometimes water is very bad, as in a flood or tsunami. It is possible to meet this objection in many ways, but even if it were granted, it still does not contradict the goodness of water. All that it proves is that the perception of the different qualities of something depends on establishing the proper conditions for observation. All cows are grey at night and to see colour, observation has to be carried out in conditions that provide for it. Similarly, in order to perceive the goodness of water, certain conditions must be in place while others will not provide for this perception. Being thirsty, for instance, is liable to result in a direct perception of water’s goodness. That water is good is not a scientific fact, and yet it is true. This can be perceived through theoria if not by theorizing.
Post-script on science and religion:
In principle, science and religion cannot be directly compared because one is seeking to measure, describe, and quantify the world while the other is teaching us how to live. In one of the scenes in the beginning of the Gospel of Matthew, the devil tells Jesus to prove that he is the Christ and “turn these stones into bread.” Jesus says “man does not live by bread alone, but by every word which proceedeth from the mouth of God.” The quote is from memory so it might not be verbatim, but I think it suffices to make the point: we cannot live by empirical facts alone.6 Anyone who thinks he can merely shows that the values by which he orders his life remain unconscious to him. Where (i.e. whence) we derive our values is another question that is separate from whether we may have them.
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For anyone with interest, I recorded these lectures on the same topic during the height of the Corona-lockdowns when my university had opted to conduct all of its courses virtually. If someone had asked me in the beginning of 2020 whether it was likely that I would find myself recording lectures and uploading them to YouTube in the near future, I would have laughed, but, as it is said, “the wisdom of this world is foolishness before God.”
Cf. Galileo, and Semmelweis, and literally any other scientist in the history of the discipline who has contributed to its progress. As it is said, in a quote often attributed to Schopenhauer though the attestation is not definitive: “All truth passes through three stages: first, it is ridiculed, second, it is violently opposed, and third, it is accepted as being self-evident.”
Boorstin, The Discoverers, 86.
For a more extended treatment of Aristotelian causality and its implications for contemporary science and sense-making, the reader may find discussions of the topic in Five Themes and The Redemption of Thinking, among many other places.
Harris, The Moral Landscape, 11.
Socrates is uncompromising on this point: “The unexamined life is not worth living” (ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ). Plato’s Apology, (38a5–6).
It may be possible to vegetate by bread alone but not to live.
I agree with the argument (how could I not?) but it never ceases to sadden me how a word so important and vast as Science has come to mean only the bottom of the barrel of knowledge (if that much).
"follow the science" is addressed to non-scientists and against irrational stupidity or simple thoughtlessness, not any reasoned philosophical view (or to other scientists!). it's true that science is not an absolute value and scientific truths aren't the only or the most important truths, but the people for whom the message is addressed are not positing a higher truth, but a lower falsehood. thus it is right to invoke scientific authority.